Thoughts on the Market

The AI Divide Between the U.S. and Japan

Morgan Stanley economists Robert Feldman and Michael Gapen analyze how artificial intelligence will impact economic growth, labor markets, and productivity in the United States and Japan.

AI is expected to contribute significantly to US GDP growth, rising from 0.05 percentage points in 2024 to 0.43 in 2027, while in Japan, it is viewed as a critical solution to intense labor shortages and low unemployment. Economists predict the US labor market can rebalance over a decade, avoiding dystopian outcomes, though rapid diffusion could cause temporary disruptions.

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11 minJul 9, 2026Thoughts on the Market

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Key takeaways

01

Divergent Economic Roles for AI

In the US, AI acts as a catalyst for investment, imports, and productivity. In Japan, it is seen as a savior for an economy facing intense labor shortages and limited room to raise labor force participation.

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02

Labor Market Rebalancing

Economists believe the US economy is flexible enough to rebalance labor over a 10-12 year diffusion period, avoiding large-scale layoffs. If diffusion is faster, it could lead to scale layoffs, rising unemployment, and underemployment.

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03

General Equilibrium Effects

AI impacts should be viewed in a general equilibrium context, considering task creation versus destruction, indirect wealth effects from capital returns, and potential monetary or fiscal policy responses to labor market disruptions.

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Market Implications

If AI is labor-augmenting, it benefits risk assets and maintains higher interest rates. If it displaces labor, returns may be narrower, favoring technology stocks over broader consumer discretionary sectors.

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Ask GenPod next

Keep the question moving.

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“How might AI impact specific industries in Japan compared to the US?”

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“What policy responses could mitigate AI-induced labor market disruptions?”

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“How do historical innovation waves compare to the current AI diffusion?”

Background reading

The context behind the episode.

Economic Context

US vs. Japan AI Scenarios

The US and Japanese economies react differently to AI productivity tests. The US focuses on investment and productivity gains, while Japan focuses on easing labor shortages. In Japan, productivity gains could lead to either deflation and weaker employment or more inflation, higher wages, and more employment depending on the scenario.

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Questions

Questions to carry into the episode.

How does Morgan Stanley model the diffusion of AI in the US economy?

The model assumes AI spreads twice as fast as the internet, taking roughly 10-12 years to fully diffuse. This timeframe is considered sufficient for the flexible US labor market to rebalance without large-scale layoffs.

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What are the potential negative outcomes if AI diffuses faster than expected?

Rapid diffusion could overwhelm the labor market's ability to reallocate workers, leading to scale layoffs, a rise in the unemployment rate, and significant underemployment where workers are rebalanced into roles inconsistent with their skills.

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How do indirect wealth effects influence the AI labor story?

While AI may cause short-term weakness in labor market income, it likely creates returns to capital and stronger equity performance. These indirect wealth effects can offset some lost income and help hold up overall demand in the economy.

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Experts

Voices named in the source.

Robert Feldman

Senior Advisor at Morgan Stanley MUFG Securities in Tokyo

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Michael Gapen

Morgan Stanley's Chief U.S. Economist

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Sources and disclosure

Where this guide comes from.

Primary material

The AI Divide Between the U.S. and Japan

Thoughts on the Market · Jul 9, 2026
How this guide was prepared

GenPod used an AI-assisted workflow to organize publisher-provided show notes into a listening guide. It is not independent reporting or fact-checking; verify important claims against the source episode.

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Source note

This guide is based on a podcast episode from 'Thoughts on the Market' featuring Morgan Stanley economists Robert Feldman and Michael Gapen.

  1. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 1

    Robert Feldman and Michael Gapen discuss how AI could reshape growth, labor markets and productivity in the U.S. and Japan.

  2. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 2

    Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.

  3. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 3

    ----- Transcript -----

  4. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 4

    Robert Feldman: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Robert Feldman, Senior Advisor at Morgan Stanley MUFG Securities in Tokyo.

  5. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 5

    Michael Gapen: And I'm Michael Gapen, Morgan Stanley's Chief U.S. Economist.

  6. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 6

    Robert Feldman: Today, we'll discuss why the U.S. and Japanese economies may react differently to the AI productivity test.

  7. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 7

    It's Thursday, July 9th at 8 pm in Tokyo.

  8. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 8

    Michael Gapen: And 9 am in New York.

  9. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 9

    Robert Feldman: AI is the biggest theme around the world right now, but AI will play out differently in different economies. Take the cases of the U.S. and Japan. In the U.S., it's already a catalyst in investment, imports, productivity, and the labor market outlook.

  10. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 10

    But here in Japan, it's seen as a savior for an economy with an intense labor shortage, low unemployment, and very little room to raise labor force participation.

  11. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 11

    Mike, in the U.S., AI's contribution to real GDP growth will rise from about 0.05 percentage points in 2024 to an estimated 0.43 percentage points in 2027.

  12. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 12

    What does that mean for markets?

  13. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 13

    Michael Gapen: Well, Robby, I think it, it means a number of things, but, you know, I'm an economist, so the answer is always, "It depends." I think the real crux of the issue over time in the U.S., and therefore what it means for financial markets, is ultimately whether AI is labor replacing – and pushes the unemployment rate higher.

  14. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 14

    Or it acts like a more traditional general-purpose technology that's labor augmenting.

  15. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 15

    So, if, that's the case, meaning it looks similar to the internet and digital era, then it would mean faster output growth, stronger productivity growth, but still an economy that's running at or near full employment.

  16. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 16

    That would be very beneficial in our estimation for risk assets, equity markets, credit markets, and it would probably mean that we stay in an interest rate environment that's certainly higher than it was during the post GFC period.

  17. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 17

    But if – AI is a very different technology than we've seen in the past, and it displaces labor, and we get increases in the unemployment rate as AI diffuses through the economy.

  18. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 18

    Then it could be very different for markets.

  19. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 19

    Maybe returns to capital and equity markets are supported, but that might be more narrowly for technology stocks and not broader, say, consumer discretionary stocks.

  20. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 20

    So, the answer, of course, is it depends. We don't know. And I think, ultimately, we come down on the side of thinking that AI will not create dystopian outcomes in the labor markets, that employment will hold up.

  21. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 21

    So, we have a fairly constructive view, perhaps an optimistic view. And we think, ultimately it'll benefit markets greatly, similar to what we saw from the mid-90s to the early 2000’s.

  22. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 22

    Robert Feldman: Well, in your model, you have a particular variable that captures the speed of diffusion. But your baseline has AI spreading twice as fast as the internet did. But without that rise of employment. Is that really manageable? And if it's not, what economic indicators would warn us, if we're crossing into the danger zone?

  23. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 23

    Michael Gapen: This is really the tricky part as, as you know.

  24. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 24

    We have to model how it diffuses through the economy.

  25. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 25

    And I would say I think there's an argument here that penetration rates and usage rates are very different than what economists think about diffusion, which is how the production process is reshaped because of this new technology.

  26. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 26

    And so most economists look at the internet and digital era and think it took 20-25 years to fully diffuse. Mass penetration in maybe 10 years, but full diffusion in more like 20-25 years. And so, each innovation cycle tends to happen more rapidly.

  27. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 27

    So, I do think AI will spread more rapidly. And even by saying it spreads twice as fast as the internet did still means that it'll take roughly a decade, maybe 10-12 years for this to fully diffuse. So, our argument here would be that that is enough time for a flexible economy and a flexible labor market, like we have in the U.S., to rebalance labor.

  28. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 28

    But if we're wrong, then Robby, what I think you will see is that as AI rolls through, it diffuses faster. And what we would see then is increases in rates of job separation and layoffs that would overwhelm the labor market's ability to reallocate workers.

  29. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 29

    So, I think we would see two things – or three things: scale layoffs, a rise in the unemployment rate, and probably a significant amount of underemployment. Those who get rebalanced may be rebalanced into work that's not, say, consistent with the skill of that worker. So, I think we would see a very disrupted labor market in the process.

  30. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 30

    But if it takes a decade, maybe 10-12 years, we think ultimately the U.S. economy is flexible enough to rebalance labor without large scale layoffs.

  31. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 31

    Robert Feldman: Now, people are afraid of a lot of things, but one other thing is that AI might create new kinds of jobs, new kinds of tasks, have different impacts on people's wealth, and different responses from policymakers as well.

  32. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 32

    How do these knock-on effects change the AI labor story?

  33. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 33

    Michael Gapen: Yeah. That's right. I think you make a very good point there that I think it's easy to fall into what an economist would call a partial equilibrium trap. So, for example, we look at occupations exposed to AI task replacement, and we say, "Wow, if all these tasks are replaced, we might lose 10 million workers or 20 million workers."

  34. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 34

    But that's too simplistic, in our view. Because as you note, AI may destroy some tasks or replace some tasks, but it's also going to create new ones. So, it may eliminate some types of occupations but create others.

  35. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 35

    And in addition, if people are, say, laid off because of AI, you get a loss in labor market income for the economy. But AI will likely create returns to capital, say, stronger equity performance, and that's an indirect wealth effect.

  36. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 36

    So, our model kind of, looks at, say, three wedges or three horse races in the economy then.

  37. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 37

    It's about the speed of diffusion of AI against the ability of the labor market to rebalance.

  38. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 38

    It's task destruction or task replacement versus new task creation.

  39. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 39

    And then third, it's we might have weakness in labor market income in the short run, but there are indirect wealth effects.

  40. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 40

    So, thinking about it this way in a richer general equilibrium context, these feedback effects matter a lot.

  41. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 41

    So, the combination of if the labor market's disrupted, we get easing in monetary policy, maybe a fiscal response.

  42. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 42

    There are new tasks, new jobs that are created for workers to rebalance to over time.

  43. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 43

    And overall demand in the economy gets held up because wealth effects can offset some lost income.

  44. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 44

    All of that is extremely important in our view that ultimately the U.S. economy can rebalance and handle the AI diffusion in a manageable way.

  45. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 45

    We could be wrong, of course, but our main point here is you have to think about this in a richer context. You can't just simply, say, stack up workers and occupations and say, "Oh, we're going to lose a lot of employment." That's not the way innovation waves have worked in the past. We don't think they're going to work that way in the future.

  46. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 46

    Robert Feldman: Mm-hmm. That's fascinating because the situation in the United States is so different from that in Japan, largely because of the demographic situation.

  47. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 47

    Here in Japan, the key element is how much AI can ease the labor shortage. In fact, in some labor-intensive jobs now, we're seeing 6 percent wage increases, and that's great. As long as productivity rises fast enough that price hikes aren't necessary.

  48. Publisher show notes · Excerpt 48

    Michael Gapen: So Robby, in your scenarios for Japan, the same 10 percent productivity gain can lead to very different outcomes. Deflation and weaker employment in one case. More inflation, higher wages, and more employment in another.

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